(Reprinted with the expressed, written permission of Rear Admiral Roger Lane-Nott CB from Dawn of a New Era, by Rear Admiral Roger Lane-Nott, Royal Navy)

INTRODUCTION

When submarine warfare is mentioned it conjures up two dominant images: firstly, the Battle of the Atlantic, an open ocean campaign against the U-boats of the Reichsmarine; and secondly the image from the cold war of the hunt for the Red October, with submarines seeking their own kind in a deadly display of blind man's bluff on the high seas.

It would, therefore, perhaps seem strange to think of a 4500 tonne, or even larger, nuclear powered submarine operating fully sub-merged within half a mile of the beach engaged in a whole range of roles. But that is precisely where the submarine fleets of the world have routinely exercised, playing an important part in the complex scenario which is warfare in littoral waters.

The post Cold War changes in the international security scene have introduced a new focus on strategic thinking, which continue to challenge planners throughout the world. The fact is that the political, economic and military threats to the national interest of every nation can no longer be defined with the clarity which drove military thinking throughout the third quarter of this century. How, then, does this translate into littoral warfare, and what part has the submarine to play?

It is helpful to set out, as a point of departure, an analysis of the nuclear submarine’s unique attributes (many, but not all of which are almost equally attributable to their conventional diesel cousins). These, not inappropriately, have been described as the "Seven Deadly Virtues".

FLEXIBILITY

The versatile and diverse suite of sensors and weapon fits allows the submarine to be deployed under a primary tasking, but capable of switching to different roles at very little notice. Submarine crews are trained to be responsive to the demands of all the roles for which the submarine is designed. Also, the range and sophistication of modern communications systems allows the detailed redeployment or retasking of submerged submarines. Communications is the key element in the full exploitation of the 'virtues'.

MOBILITY

The submarine, and particularly the nuclear submarine, can move quickly forward to operating areas. Once in theatre it can range freely and at speed, thereby adding a multiplying factor in the mind of a potential opponent. This is especially significant in adverse weather, where the SSN's speed advantage over most surface ships is further amplified.

STEALTH

The submarine is a quintessential stealth weapon. Departing discreetly from home waters, she can be deployed into areas which are denied to surface and air forces. Lying off a coast, she can be withdrawn as discreetly as she arrived, permitting withdrawal or redeployment at will, and without obvious provocation or escalation.

All nations recognise the immense value of covert intelligence gathering and surveillance by submarines. These operations can be mounted at all levels of the crisis spectrum. This stealth affords submarines a degree of survivability which is not enjoyed by any other arm and allows them a classic element of military success - surprise.

The sophistication of their communications allows them to be immediately responsive to a developing or rapidly escalating situation and to prepare for the deployment of more substantial and diverse forces should they be required. More subtly, like a minefield, the submarine does not need even to be in an area to affect the deliberations of a potential adversary - the rumour is normally enough.

AVAILABILITY

The established practice of maintaining nominated submarines at high degrees of readiness to respond in specific theatres has been a proven method of responding to a wide variety of crises and contingencies. When needed one can be there.

ENDURANCE

Since the USS TRITON first circumnavigated the globe, the endurance of the nuclear submarine has been well recognised. Regular operations in the southern hemisphere and the Indian Ocean serve to underline their ability to be deployed at extended range and, once there, to remain on station, unsupported, for prolonged periods. The endurance and self sustainability of the nuclear submarine is limited only by the size of her food supply. This capacity for endurance can be a major piece on the chess boards of both the military planner and the politician.

REACH

Mobility, together with endurance in the SSN, give the politician unrivalled reach in terms of power projection, demonstrated by the presence of a nuclear submarine on station in distant waters. It also gives tangible evidence of commitment and a registration of interest at home. Alternatively this reach can be used to stimulate or reinforce friendly relations and strengthen the resolve of threatened friendly nations.

World-wide deployments of submarines avail the opportunity to foster relations with allies and Commonwealth partners, using the vehicle of mutually beneficial training exercises and allow the cross pollination of ideas and principles. Using a submarine is a cost effective instrument for nurturing foreign policy aims of co-operation and collaboration. However, it must be said that the covert nature of submarine operations and the availability of berths limits the more visible, traditional aspects of this capability - it is the deployed presence rather than the profile which counts.

AUTONOMY

While the submarine can operate independently of other assets, it is a powerful warfare asset in its own right. Modern communications allow access to constantly refined data, give it access to up to the minute intelligence, improved connectivity with surface forces and shore Headquarters, and the ability to intervene decisively in all maritime scenarios, without dependence on other assets for its own protection or projection of capability.

The second step must be to define the term 'littoral' within this context of specialist operating. The definition will reflect military capability in a given situation, rather than rest wholly on geographical factors, reflecting on the ability of the aggressor nation to project its sea and air power.

In general, this is probably unlikely to be more than 200 nm from his coast anywhere in the world. It also implies operations in oceanic waters. Thus, any sea area commander about to embark on naval operations within the littoral will be obliged to consider the full range of threats to his force. At first, at extreme range from the coast, these threats will be limited. However, as he approaches they will become more varied and numerous. His threat appreciation probably contains the following elements:

Surface combatants - No great concern. Autonomous surveillance capable of constant location.

Conventional submarines - No worry if he knows where they are but they could pose a problem from short range torpedo attack.

Shore based aircraft - It would be useful to have timely air raid warning.

Shore surveillance - Can he get through? Are there any gaps in coverage? Is the enemy capable of moving elements of his surveillance architecture and changing the location of the coverage?

Mining - Has he laid any minefields recently? If so, where are they?

There are no great problems there - especially at stand off ranges. But as the task force approaches ever closer the need for sea denial to the aggressor will become more critical. What is it that changes?

The most significant feature of proximity to the coast is that it cuts down the reaction time and thus the task force commander will demand an ever more timely picture of the preparedness and whereabouts of his opposition. Eventually, the decision may be made that unless certain elements are removed from the equation the task force cannot safely approach any closer. Initial strikes aimed at particular military installations may be required. Ultimately the battle for sea control may have to be fought.

SUBMARINE TASKS

How, then, do the seven deadly virtues apply in this context? In the early stages the submarine can be deployed in advance and at high speed and can be placed as close to the coast as the military demands and the political situation permits.

Tasking will be predominantly three-fold: firstly, watching for indicators of changes to military and civilian posture and providing the advanced warnings of these changes. This can be achieved perhaps by monitoring a whole range of shore based communications systems, not all military, and especially those designed to radiate minimal power upwards towards the waiting satellite.

Secondly there is the more obvious military intelligence gathering and finally insertion of Special Forces. More specifically no other unit has the ability to poise in this way. Remaining undetected in an area where you may not have air superiority, the submarine can hold on station indefinitely until the political situation is resolved or military planning reaches maturity.

Thirdly, as the task force approaches, and if the aggressor remains unrepentant, then the next significant move may be a coercive strike. Such a move can have immense political impact. Imagine, if you will, a salvo of TOMAHAWK arriving as if from nowhere. Indeed, the threat of such a strike is of itself probably sufficient, and, of course, the simple fact that the opponent is aware that you possess the capability may be all that is needed.

INSHORE OPERATIONS

Eventually the task force will reach the inshore area. Tasking for the submarine can take a new twist, perhaps into areas not normally associated with submariners and submarine warfare. No longer does the submarine mount a gun on its forward casing, but this does not mean that it can no longer take part in shore bombardment. With direct ship-to-ship satellite communications the destroyer, with its long range gun, can remain safely over the horizon whilst the submarine from close inshore can carry out the spotting.

Perhaps the political risk from landing special forces was assessed as too high, here is the alternative. Provided that the target is sufficiently close to the shoreline for the submarine to have a clear view what better way is there?

Meanwhile, the submarine's sonar will be continuing to sanitise the area from enemy submarines. But, effective as this may be, there can be no substitute for the covert patroller spotting the enemy and heads towards its diving position. Even the quietest of submarines will have some difficulty in shaking off its tail if it is seen diving. And finally, before the task force enters the littoral and commits itself, the submarine remains the only platform capable of fully covert mining operations.

Once in the inshore area, the submarine would probably be directly tasked by the on scene commander, which has just been outlined, and would continue, perhaps with changed emphasis (battlefield communications intercept is perfectly possible from a submarine) the new tasks could include direct ASW support to the force and air raid warning. Again a well rehearsed skill, especially if the submarine can be placed at the end of the runway. Ultimately the submarine call join in high intensity operations with its TLAM and powerful anti-ship and ASW torpedoes.

SUMMARY

The submarine is a major contributor to operations in the littoral. In view of the conceivable threat scenarios, perhaps even more so than at any time in its history. No task force should, therefore, be without its submarines. The SSK and SSC undoubtedly have their part to play, particularly if time allows for their deployment into theatre.

However, the rapid mobility, endurance and flexibility of the SSN confers substantial additional advantage. The ability to get there quickly and stay there for protracted periods whilst remaining undetected provides the planners and the on scene commander with a huge breadth of capability which cannot be found concentrated in any other single platform.

CONCLUSIONS

The battle of Midway was the first in which the respective fleets never caught sight of each other: it may have been the last major engagement on the open ocean. As naval warfare moves into the twenty-first century, the naval force must be prepared to conduct its operations closer in shore.

It is only with the inclusion of submarines that the Task Force Commander can be so prepared, indeed sufficiently prepared that he can, with confidence, take his fleet into the littoral.