First, Bauer realized that fighter combat in WWII was not a joust between individual aircraft. He believed that if US airmen would stick with a wingman, or, better yet, operate in the famous "finger four" formation that tactics could trump the technological superiority the Zero had in a dogfight. In a one on one engagement the Zero certainly had the upper hand.

As the great Marine ace at Cactus Joe Foss remarked, "if you were alone and saw a Zero at the same altitude you were flying, you were outnumbered and it was time to get out." Bauer himself once quipped that "The Zero is faster than the Wildcat, can out-climb it, can turn inside it and do maneuvers the Wildcat will never match. Aside from that, we have a better plane.." Bauer's comments show that he knew that a Zero was very vulnerable in a fight between formations. He told his men in late October "Be an aggressor. Have complete faith in your armor and confidence in your ability to shoot down the enemy when you get him in your sights."

Bauer counted on tactics and chaos to equalize the odds. Tactically, Bauer was a great believer in the "scissors." There were many variations of the scissors with the complex "Thatch Weave" the most famous and probably most rare. All shared a basic concept. If a pilot believed that either he or his partner was about to be hit from the rear, he turned toward his wingman. The wing reacted by also turning toward his partner. This left a pursuing fighter in a quandary: he either had to break off the attack or face a head-on pass by the second defender.

Furthermore, Bauer knew that once a fighter engagement began, the rule-book went out the window. All planes had blind spots. No pilot, regardless of skill, could track all of the action. By simply "mixing it up" Bauer knew that his men would inevitably get opportunities to fire at unsuspecting Zeros at close range. Obviously, however, his pilots would be vulnerable to counterblow. (2)

In Bauer's eyes this was a worthwhile exchange. The Zero was a wonderful aircraft but proved a poor fighter. Its legendary maneuverability, rate of climb, astounding range and excellent speed resulted from its very low weight. It is often noted that the Zero lacked armor and self-sealing fuel tanks, valuable features found in the Wildcat. Just as importantly, however, was the structural weakness of the Zero's airframe. A very few American .50 caliber rounds could cause structural failure which in turn caused explosion.

Exactly the opposite was the case for the Wildcat. Like all US aircraft the F4F was extremely rugged. The light armor provided for the pilot was proof against the Zero's .30 caliber machine guns. The inherent strength of the aircraft made it far less prone to structural failure. Consequently, barring some very bad luck, a Japanese pilot had to clobber a Wildcat with his .20 mm cannon to bring it down. If a small portion of a Wildcat's bullet stream struck home, a Zero would probably die.

This math spelled doom for Japan in the Pacific theater. It is rarely appreciated how difficult it was in World War II for one fighter to hit another. Gunsights were crude, guns often jammed and if yaw, pitch or roll were even slightly different than the pilot believed, the bullet stream would miss. If the enemy was evading, the problem multiplied. Consequently, most planes were struck from very close range. Joe Foss, like so many WWII aces, urged his men to fire at point-blank range.

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Men of Marine Fighting Squadron 212

Nevertheless most rounds missed under the best of circumstances. Over Pacific skies, the small percentage of American rounds that struck home meant a torched Zero. Incidental fire from a Japanese fighter meant American mechanics would have to patch some holes. As crack Japanese pilots died off, and as Americans introduced superior aircraft such as the P38, Corsair and Hellcat, the Pacific air war became a route.

Over Guadalcanal Bauer's change of tactics paid off quickly. The battle of October 18 at least four Zeros and three Bettys went down at the cost of two Wildcats (both pilots rescued.) Two days later the Marines won another engagement which claimed the life of Ota Toshio, a leader of the vaunted Tainan Air Group and the top Japanese ace (34 claimed kills) to die in the Guadalcanal campaign.

On October 25th the Japanese launched one of their largest attacks against Cactus which included 82 aircraft of all types. Fourteen, including eleven Zeros, were destroyed by the Marines at the cost of two fighters. During this period pilots like Joe Foss and Jack Conger added significantly to their kill totals. More important was the trend that developed. Prior to mid-October the Zeros usually bested the pilots at Cactus. After this time until the end of the Guadalcanal campaign in January 1943, the pilots at Cactus normally came out on top.

The Japanese lost over 600 aircraft at Guadalcanal and far worse was to come over the Solomons in 1943. However, Joe Bauer did not live to see his decision fully vindicated. On November 14, 1942, in the midst of a savage three day naval battle that destroyed any Japanese hopes for victory at Guadalcanal, Bauer insisted on accompanying Joe Foss on a strafing run against Japanese transports. As an operational commander Bauer was not expected to fly, but his fighter pilot instincts overcame protocol. Minutes later Bauer shot down his last Zero. Simultaneously struck by anti-aircraft fire coming from a Japanese destroyer, Bauer crashed. Foss saw Bauer swimming near the shoreline of Guadalcanal and rushed back to Henderson for aid. Bauer, however, was never seen again.

1.Some accounts talk of engagements at 30,000 feet. I am skeptical that such altitudes were often obtained considering the low horsepower, poor blower and crude oxygen systems possessed by the F4F. Interviews I have done with Cactus pilots support these doubts. The Zero was likewise straining to fight at 25,000 feet for the same reasons.

2. In theory the Japanese could have countered with similar tactics but failed to do so. Japanese fighter tactics were based a very loose three plane "vee", called a "shotai", that would switch to a line-ahead attack formation when the flight leader signaled with wings and hands. To a degree the very slack Japanese formations reflected the Zero's lack of a reliable radio.

More importantly, however, the prewar Japanese doctrine had stressed an unheard of level of training. The shotai's leader and his wingmen developed an instinctive knowledge of what each other would do. Early in the war this doctrine brought spectacular results. However, as combat and inevitable operational losses mounted, the shotais lost cohesion. As was so often the case in the Pacific, the Japanese were extremely slow to react to doctrinal errors and American tactical superiority accompanied eventual numerical and technological superiority.