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The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam
by Dave Pascoe
 

Author: John L. Plaster

The title sounds like one of those titillating exposes on horrible things done by the US military during the Vietnam war by Peter Arnett, CNN and the usual stuff by that gang of anti military, establishment journalists. But it's not.

There are no stories here about commandos using nerve gas on the Vietnamese people as they lug bags of rice down the Ho Chi Minh trail on their backs. No stories about ruthless US Commanders sending out assassination squads to murder deserting or captured American soldiers in Cambodia. Nothing about evil commandos determined to "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out." If one is looking for tender morsels to justify a viewpoint of the evil of US involvement in Vietnam, you won't find it here.

One of the few commando books to be first published in hardcover, SOG is an exceptionally well researched account of the Special Operations Group mission in Indochina, covert and otherwise. I rate it as one of the best books on the subject, as told from the summary viewpoint of the men in the field, their field officers and commanders. It is this three-way perspective that gives the book a certain uniqueness.

Many readers will recognize that US involvement in Vietnam began as early as the late 1950's (the official records of which remain classified) under the auspices of the CIA and William Colby, one of the top OSS operatives during WW II, and who later was to become the Director of Central Intelligence. If ever there were a man who knew how to run a covert war, it was Bill Colby, and while this book has nothing to do with the former DCI, it has everything to do with his philosophy on counterinsurgency.

SOG, originally named the Special Operations Group, was formed up exclusively of volunteers from SEALS, Green Berets, Rangers and Air Force Commandos, for political reasons SOG was given the hilarious official name of Studies and Observations Group. While observation was indeed a large part of it's role, the "study" was largely confined to methods to methods by which to harass and terrorize the enemy through covert operations.

SOG was the brainchild of no one, but the outgrowth of three presidential administrations and the CIA's desire for intelligence and the covert effort to counteract Communist insurgency into South Vietnam from obstenisbly neutral Laos and Cambodia. This, in the interest of "containing" the war within Vietnam's boundaries that it might not escallate into a widespread Indochina war.

A little known fact is that the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos had its beginning all the way back in 1953 when the Viet Minh reestablished an old network of roadways to initiate attacks on the south. For political reasons, the Johnson Administration publicly ignored and downplayed this. Thus, the war had spread into these countries at least a decade before US troop deployment.

From Robert McNamara's infamous OPLAN 34A in December 1963, SOG recounts some of the more spectacular exploits of these behind the scenes commandos, up through the ill-fated ARVN operation Lam Son 729 in 1972, that last year of American troops in Vietnam. Included are the exploits of the legendary commando Jerry "Mad Dog" Shriver, so nicknamed not by his peers, but by Hanoi Radio who put a very high bounty on his head. Shriver served three years with SOG, the longest stint by any recon man during the war.

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Cover

Typically Shriver:

It was Mad Dog Shriver who'd spoken the most famous rejoinder in SOG history: His team surrounded and Command concerned that [his team] might be overrun, a Forward Air Controller told Shriver, "It sounds pretty bad down there." And Shriver replied, "No, no, I've got them right where I want them -- surrounded from the inside."

SOG units had both major similarities and differences from the recon units that were later formed, units such as the Army LRRP's, Marine Force Recon units and many others. First and foremost was the fact that Special Operations Groups were not under the command of MACV and General Westmoreland, but rather the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs themselves for covert security reasons.

For political reasons that today seem nothing if not bizarre, SOG groups were considered to be "illegal" and therefore conducted with the greatest of secrecy. This made them different to the extent that the restraints placed on the "official," MACV-designated (Military Assistance Command - Vietnam) recon teams did not exist for SOG. They were "go-anywhere, do anything" commandos with the dual role of recon and taking the battle to the enemy.

In the later regard, they performed much like the early SEAL missions -- before their free reign was curtailed -- where a major element of their role was sowing fear amongst the enemy operating over the borders. Unlike the large numbers of recon units that would follow, the SOG mission was offensive, facilitated in no small part by those inherently devious former OSS men who were to direct it's operations.

While the arguments continue to rage about which of the numerous recon units throughout the war conducted the greater exploits, none of the others were ever sanctioned to operate over Vietnam's borders, and none were officially (albeit covertly) sanctioned for offensive operations. SOG was, and this is what makes for some truly spectacular operations and one hell of a good read.

As Plaster points out, a mere 50 SOG Americans caused the NVA to devote three full divisions to guard the Ho Chi Minh trail, an economy of force ratio of 600:1, or one full battalion per SOG man. It was not a matter of how many enemy they could kill, but how many NVA could be tied up and taken out of offensive operations that mattered.

This is the essence of the SOG strategy, letting the enemy know that just because he was operating in Cambodia did not mean that he was going to be safe. The tiny six-man SOG teams would take every opportunity to attack and harass the enemy. From blowing up ammo dumps, laying booby traps and ambushes, to snatching messengers and officers off the trial, they did it all.

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