by David Buckingham

This article was written for a 20th century history class. Aside from an excellent historical summary of the impact of the Mustang on the progress of WWII, it shows that there are some very gifted students of military history out there. Thanks to David for his work!

Abstract

This paper deals with the contributions of the P-51 Mustang to the eventual victory of the Allies in Europe during World War II. It describes the war scene in Europe before the P-51 was introduced, traces the development of the fighter, its advantages, and the abilities it was able to contribute to the Allies' arsenal.

The paper concludes with the effect that the P-51 had on German air superiority, and how it led the destruction of the Luftwaffe. The thesis is that: it was not until the advent of the North American P-51 Mustang fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side effects that it brought with it, that the Allies were able to achieve air superiority over the Germans.

This paper was inspired largely by my grandfather, who flew the P-51 out of Leiston, England, during WW II and contributed to the eventual Allied success that is traced in this paper. He flew over seventy missions between February and August 1944, and scored three kills against German fighters.

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation
• The Pre-P-51 Situation
• The Allied Purpose in the Air War
• The Battle at Schweinfurt
• The Development of the P-51
• The Installation of the Merlin Engines
• Features, Advantages, and Benefits of the P-51
• The P-51's Battle Performance
• The Change in Policy on Escort Fighter Function
• P-51's Disrupt Luftwaffe Fighter Tactics
• P-51's Give Bombers Better Support
• Conclusion
• Works Cited

Introduction

On September 1, 1939, the German military forces invaded Poland to begin World War II. This invasion was very successful because of its use of a new military strategic theory -- blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg, literally "lightning war," involved the fast and deadly coordination of two distinct forces, the Wermacht and the Luftwaffe.

The Wermacht advanced on the ground, while the Luftwaffe destroyed the enemy air force, attacked enemy ground forces, and disrupted enemy communication and transportation systems. This setup was responsible for the successful invasions of Poland, Norway, Western Europe, the Balkans and the initial success of the Russian invasion.

For many years after the first of September, the air war in Europe was dominated by the Luftwaffe. No other nation involved in the war had the experience, technology, or numbers to challenge the Luftwaffe's superiority.

It was not until the United States joined the war effort that any great harm was done to Germany and even then, German air superiority remained unscathed. It was not until the advent of the North American P-51 Mustang fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side effects that it brought with it, that the Allies were able to achieve air superiority over the Germans.

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Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation

The continued domination of the European skies by the Luftwaffe was caused by two factors, the first of which was the difference in military theory between the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force. The theories concerning the purpose and function of the Luftwaffe and RAF were exactly opposite and were a result of their experiences in World War I. During WW I, Germany attempted a strategic bombing effort directed against England using Gothas (biplane bombers) and Zeppelins (slow-moving hydrogen balloons) which did not give much of a result.

This, plus the fact that German military theory at the beginning of WW II was based much more on fast, quick results (Blitzkrieg), meant that Germany decided not to develop a strategic air force. The Luftwaffe had experienced great success when they used tactical ground-attack aircraft in Spain (e.g. at Guernica), and so they figured that their air force should mainly consist of this kind of plane. So Germany made the Luftwaffe a ground support force that was essentially an extension of the army and functioned as a long- range, aerial artillery.

The RAF, on the other hand, had experimented with ground-attack fighters during WW I, and had suffered grievous casualty rates. This, combined with the fact that the British had been deeply enraged and offended by the German Gotha and Zeppelin attacks on their home soil, made them determined to develop a strategic air force that would be capable of bombing German soil in the next war. Thus, at the beginning of WW II, the RAF was mostly a strategic force that consisted of heavy bombers and backup fighters, and lacked any tactical dive-bombers or ground-attack fighters. (Boyne 21)

The Pre-P-51 Situation

Because of these fundamental differences, the situation that resulted after the air war began was as follows: bombers in enemy territory vs. attack planes. The "in enemy territory" was the second reason for the domination of the Luftwaffe.

At the beginning of WW II, and for many years afterward, the Allies had no long-range escort fighters, which meant that the bombers were forced to fly most of their long journeys alone. (Perret 104)

Before the P-51 was brought into combat, the main Allied fighters were the American P-47 Thunderbolt and the British Spitfire, neither of which had a very long range. The rule-of-thumb for fighter ranges was that they could go as far as Aachen, which was about 250 miles from the Allied fighters' home bases in England, before they had to turn around. Unfortunately, most of the bombers' targets were between 400 and 700 miles from England. (Bailey 2-3)

This meant that bombers could only be escorted into the Benelux countries, northern France, and the very western fringe of Germany. When these unescorted, ungainly, slow, unmaneuverable bombers flew over Germany, they were practically sitting ducks for the fast German fighters.

On the other hand, the bombers were equipped with several machine guns and were able to consistently shoot down some of their attackers. Because of this, "U.S. strategists were not yet convinced of the need for long-range fighters; they continued to cling to the belief that their big bomber formations could defend themselves over Germany." (Bailey 153)

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