5.0 Requirements Definition
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Office has met the challenge extended by DoD Acquisition Reform Initiatives to involve the warfighters up front in weapon system development, exploit the tools of modeling and simulation, and treat cost as an independent variable. JSF has built upon a foundation of work using the strategy-to-task methodology, qualitative assessment tools such as Quality Function Deployment (QFD), and quantitative, simulation-assisted wargaming analyses of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)-based Major Regional Contingency (MRC) scenarios in the 2010 timeframe. Five major wargames have been held with warfighters of the Force Process Team (FPT) and Operational Advisory Group (OAG) along with Industry (Figure 5-1). They conducted joint strike warfare campaigns in MRC scenarios to assess the capabilities of our forces projected into the 2010 timeframe and to determine force deficiencies in meeting the National Military Strategy: "Win Quickly, Decisively, and with Minimum Casualties."
Exercising this process resulted in the completion of a Joint Mission Area Analysis (JMAA) of the Strike Mission Area (Figure 5-2). By using the wargaming process, the warfighters developed a "bestuse of force" for application of warfighting assets. Integral to this activity was the examination of non-material solutions (tactics, doctrine, procedures, etc.) to address deficiencies in accomplishingoperational tasks. The baseline campaign results provided a robust deficiencies analysis and benchmark for future evaluation of contractor concepts for the JSF.
Figure 5-2. Joint Mission Area Analysis Activities
5.2 Strike Deficiencies
5.2.1. Requirement Pillars
JSF RQ Directorate orchestrated the efforts of the 65 member DoD and industry analytical team which produced the first strategy-to-task, top down assessment of Strike Warfare. This effort resulted in grouping Strike Warfare deficiencies into three centralized areas, or "Pillars." These Pillars are Survivability, Supportability/ Deployability, and Lethality, with the overarching issue of Affordability. Strike Warfare Deficiencies (Figure 5-3) illustrates the strategy-to-task process and the generated deficiencies
Figure 5-3. Strike Warfare Deficiencies
Due to high attrition from mobile SAMs, strike forces were unable to rapidly interdict enemy ground forces and deny them critical objectives. Interdiction missions required higher levels of supporting SEAD forces in order to ensure survivability of the strike force and diverted assets from the primary mission of force application. This resulted in significantly higher losses to friendly ground forces and failure to deny enemy ground forces their critical objectives.
Forces projected for 2010 have extensive logistic footprints, which lengthen deployment and response time (as during Desert Shield). The resulting required movement time and airlift precludes a rapid build up of force capabilities to counter a short warning time scenario. Sortie rates at the start of a campaign are constrained by reliability, maintainability, and supportability, limiting the frequency of force application.
Strike forces had limited effectiveness against highly mobile/short dwell targets (tanks, armor, SSMs) and destruction of dispersed enemy shipping. Forces were not able to rapidly destroy nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Accurate delivery of weapons in adverse weather delayed attainment of objectives. Developers were actively involved in the wargames, and they were able to aggressively tackle trade studies to address key weapon attributes and characteristics.
Weapons system contractors have worked closely with the warfighters to address affordable solutions to rectify strike warfare deficiencies in their JSF concepts through a series of studies addressing cost vs. effectiveness of the weapon system.
The deficiencies in the JMAA combined with industry trade studies on cost vs. effectiveness as well as the needs of the Services to meet these deficiencies have provided the rationale for the Joint Initial Requirements Document (JIRD) (Figure 5-5) signed by the three Services and supported by the JROC.
Figure 5-5. JIRD-I Characteristics
5.3 JIRD-I Characteristics
5.3.1 Sortie Generation Rate & Logistics Footprint
A weapon system with a lean footprint and an enhanced sortie generation rate (SGR) can deliver impressive combat power as a force application tool available to the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Historical DoD-sponsored studies (B-2 bomber, C-17, etc.) have consistently pointed to the value of achieving high sortie generation levels. Baseline FPT campaign wargaming illustrated that the limited sorties available by current strike platforms delayed attainment of JFC objectives.
Analyses determined that early-phase mission requirements would be optimized through combined improvements in the rate of force closure (achieved through reduced logistics footprint -- number of C-141 loads) and high sortie generation rate capability. Lethality metrics (kill rates, etc.) show that a 25% percent increase in sortie generation rate and 50% reduction in deployment footprint have the best synergistic effect upon campaign outcome. The JIRD-I values for SGR and logistics footprint fall within these ranges.
Internal payload requirements of the three JSF variants are based on detailed campaign and target engagement analyses. These analyses showed that the ability to rapidly prosecute and kill small mobile targets (tanks, APCs, towed artillery, ships) and fixed tactical targets (supply depots, air fields, lines of communications) were two of the more leveraging lethality factors in a campaign's outcome. Detailed target engagement analyses show that these types of targets are very susceptible to an array of 1000 lb class weapons. The USN requirement for 2-2000 lb or 2 JSOW weapons internally is primarily based on the requirement to hold hardened strategic targets at risk in the early days of the campaign. It is important to note that all the JSF variants are capable of externally carrying the necessary weapons required to hold such strategic type targets at risk.
5.3.3 IR & RF Signature
Initial survivability studies on signature (both radio frequency and infrared) and self-protection suite combinations using detailed campaign, mission, and engagement level analyses demonstrate that high survivability provided by stealth is one of the more leveraging JSF attributes. Survivability is the key to weapon system persistence. Reduced signature allows for a reduction in the number of combat support sorties required.
JSF explored the unique target distribution of each of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) threat countries to determine the range required for JSF to strike targets. When combined with the long-range resources available to the JFC, a JSF range of 400 NM into enemy territory is sufficient to strike 90 percent of the target set. The actual combat range required then becomes dependent upon Service basing concepts. The USN will operate from carriers off shore at a distance in concert with the threat and will require a minimum of 600 NM combat range. The quantity of aircraft the USAF would deploy into theater and the basing distribution of those aircraft will require an Air Force combat range of 450-600 NM. The USMC concept of basing flexibility and forward basing, both afloat and ashore, decreases range requirements so that 450-550 NM is sufficient.
5.3.5 CV Suitability and Basing Flexibility
Carrier suitability is fundamental to carrier air operations within the Navy, and basing flexibility is fundamental to the expeditionary character of the Marine Corps. Basing flexibility provides the foundation for forward basing which, in turn, increases the responsiveness. This flexibility substantially increases the number of airfields from which to conduct operations, allows more assets to be brought into theater, decreases the response time of aircraft without the use of airborne support, and provides dispersal for high-value assets, thus reducing vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack.
5.3.6 Speed and Maneuverability
Speed and maneuverability are characteristics for which more capability is generally considered better, but the benefits are not unlimited and they will rapidly accelerate cost. The JSF should retain capabilities comparable to current multi-role aircraft. This level of performance is necessary to successfully engage, counter, and survive both air-to-air and surface-to-air threats.
Because cost is being considered as an independent variable, the JSF acquisition strategy was based on a family of strike variants in order to enhance affordability. All requirements trades are being evaluated not only for their operational value, but cost as well. Performing continuous Cost of Operational Performance Trades (COPT) will enable the program to optimize return on investment for DoD and remain within allocated total obligation authority. These will form the basis for an independent Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to support a Milestone II decision in 2001. JIRD-I was focused on qualities and characteristics that drive the outer mold line of the aircraft designs. The attributes addressed in JIRD-I were determined by the industry and warfighter team early in the STT process.
JIRD-II (Figure 5-6) will emphasize key avionics trades, especially target acquisition, weapon system deliveries, accuracy, supportability versus radar cross section, and supportability versus diagnostics. Additional JIRD updates will be accomplished each year until the Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) is produced by the three services in FY 1999.
Figure 5-6. JIRD-II Areas of Emphasis
5.4 System of Systems
In the near future, detailed trade studies involving the complete "System-of-Systems" will be addressed through the Virtual Strike Warfare Environment (Figure 5-7). For example, the JSF On-Board/Off-Board (JOBOB) Information Fusion and Management Study was a BAA 94-2 Technology Maturation effort conducted by the Lockheed Martin Corporation. The purpose of the study was to investigate the benefits of exploiting the vast amount of battlespace information available to but not fully exploited in current generation aircraft. The study indicates that delivery of ordnance against most of the targets that would be allocated to the JSF requires the use of on-board sensors. However, increased performance provided by exploiting off-board sensors and guided weapons will expand the target set the JSF can hold at risk.
Figure 5-7. On-Board/Off-Board System of Systems
Enhancements in situational awareness will require a paradigm shift in the way in which we manage information in the cockpit and a revolutionary approach to the distribution of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data. Twelve on-board/off-board avionics configurations have been evaluated. The conclusions of the JOBOB study were that off-board information can be used for detections, the data can be fused with on-board sensor tracks, information management can effectively regulate pilots situational awareness, and avionics procurement costs could be reduced by 4 to 20 percent per shipset through the use of off-board information in the cockpit.
Pilots found that use of off-board sensor data and information management policies yield measurable improvements in the ability to prosecute targets in a survivable manner. These preliminary results need to be extended by more robust analysis to identify key assumptions and remove key study limitations. These activities and insights are expected to be useful in the formulation of key avionics trade studies and resulting weapon system requirements for JIRD-II in Fall 1996.
Execution of these and other key activities is essential to meet the goals of the JSF Requirements Definition and Evolution process. This process must: Ensure that the warfighter requirements are always related to national military strategy through a system-of-systems approach; Institute processes, tools, and methodology needed for a continuous COPTs; Create a joint, common, and accredited modeling & simulation environment for government and industry; ensure that supportability requirements and cost impacts receive strong emphasis early in the requirements process; and Exploit the emerging virtual simulation technologies to affordably augment flight demonstrations.
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